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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FLINCO, INC., a Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

vs.
THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBB~R COMP ANY, a Foreign Corpora hon,
D f' d

No.
10321

e en ant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATE.MENT OF THE NATURE OF THE
CASE
This action was brought by a dealer in tires, batteries and accessories (TBA) to recover damages from
its former supplier for the alleged breach of a dealership contract and for an alleged violation of a state
antitrust statute, § 50-1-2 UTAH CODE ANN. (1953).
Defendant counterclaimed to recover sums owing for
goods sol<l and delivered ( R. 19-20). The allegations
1

of the counterclaim were not in dispute and plaintiff
has paid in full the amount claimed (R. 27-30, 33).
DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
The remainder of the case was tried before a jury,
the IIonorable Ray Van Cott, Jr., presiding. .Follow·
ing plaintiff's opening statement, defendant moved for
a directed verdict on the grounds that on the law and
the facts as asserted by plaintiff's counsel plaintiff was
not entitled to relief ( R. 40-41, 52-53). The court took
the motion under advisement and, following comple·
tion of plaintiff's testimony on the issue of liability,
granted it ( R. 224-230).
RELIEl-. SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff has appealed for an order reversing the
ruling of the trial court and requiring both of its claims
to be submitted to the jury (R. 31). Defendant submits
that the order of the trial court should be affirmed.
TI-IE FACTS OF RECORD
This case arises out of the termination of a fran·
chise agreement (Ex. 1) by written notice dated Sep·
tember 16, 1963 (Ex. 2). Under the agreement, signed
by the parties on June 21, 1962, the plaintiff, Flinco,
Inc. ( Flinco), had been a dealer in TBA manufactured
by defendant, The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company
(Goodyear) .
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Plaintiff is a Utah corporation having its principal
off ice and place of business at 133 North First West ,
Salt Lake City, Utah. At all times material it was an
independent distributor of petroleum of the Texas
Company (Texaco) to Texaco service stations in Salt
Lake City and vicinity (R. 43). In 1962 and 1963
Flinco was the contracted supplier of petroleum products to eleven of the approximately forty such stations;
Flinco owned or leased six or eight of these eleven,
which it either operated itself or leased to others (R.
61, 83, 109).

In about 1959 Flinco began to distribute automobile tires as a sideline to its petroleum business. In
that year it distributed the U. S. Rubber Company's
"Gillette" brand, but in early 1960 it switched to B. F.
Goodrich Company's "Hood" line (R. 95-96; Ex. 4).
In 1961 its purchases of Hood tires amounted to $88,000., and in the first six months of 1962 they totaled
$54,000. (Ex. 5). This volume was achieved despite
Texaco's policy that only the three major brands of
tires (B. F. Goodrich, Firestone and U. S. Royal)
might be charged on Texaco credit cards-a restriction
which confined plaintiff's tire sales to its retail outlet
at 133 North First 'Vest (R. 44-45, 106-107).
Early in 1962 Texaco designated defendant Goodyear, a nationally known manufacturer of rubber products, as a fourth brand which might be charged on
Texaco credit cards; and in May of that year G. E.
apRoberts, plaintiff's vice-president, and Ed Ferguson,

3

then Goodyear district manager, began to discuss the
feasibility of Flinco's becoming a franchised Goodyear
dealer ( R. 47 -49) . On June 21 they signed the .Franchise Agreement which is in evidence as Exhibit I.
apRoberts admitted at the trial that Ferguson did not
ask him to cancel the Hood contract in order to take
on the Goodyear line, but that he chose to do so because
Flinco could not afford the expense of carrying two
separate inventories and because he was "not naive
enough to have believed we would have received the
Goodyear line without offering to terminate the Hood
line" (R. 80-81, 102, 104-105).
Paragraphs six, thirteen, and fourteen of the agreement cover the subject of cancellation, and provide:
6. Upon failure of the Dealer to make any
payments when due, Goodyear may, at its op·
tion, cancel this agreement or defer additional
shipments until overdue accounts have been paid.
Goodyear may decline to make deliveries except
for cash whenever it is not satisfied with Dealer's
financial responsibility.
13. This agreement shall become effective
when signed by an authorized District Manager
of Goodyear and shall expire five ( 5) years from
date of execution unless otherwise previously
terminated as hereinafter provided. It cancels
and supersedes any other Franchise. Agreement
and any other sales agreement now m effect be·
tween the parties covering th~ sale by Goodyear
to the Dealer of any product mcluded hereunder.
(Emphasis supplied).
14. Thi8 agreement may b.e cancelled upon
thirty ( 30) days' written notice by the Dealer
0
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to Goodyear, or by Goodyear through its local

m~nag~r

to the Dealer.

At the expiration of

s~1d thirty ( 30) days, Goodyear shall have the
right ~o cancel all unfilled orders, and during

such time may refuse any orders in excess of the
average thirty-day requirements of the Dealer
based on orders actually given hereunder durmg the term hereof. (Emphasis supplied).
Paragraph twelve of the agreement states, in large
print:
12. The entire agreement regarding the subject matter is set forth herein. Any change in
the printed terms, other than a change in the
terms of settlement making all invoices payable
C. 0. D., shall make this agreement void: No
modification or amendment shall be effective
unless in writing signed by an authorized representative of the Dealer and by an executive
officer of Goodyear.

Plaintiff sought at the trial to introduce testimony
that during the negotiations prior to June 21, 1962,
defendant had represented "that the agreement between the parties would be for a five-year period."
Defendant objected on the ground that the offered
testimony would vary the terms of the written instrument, and the trial court sustained the objection (R.
68-70).

The Goodyear franchise gave plaintiff two advantages it had not previously enjoyed: it "opened up" for
plaintiff "an avenue to establish forty [Texaco] stations" as additional TBA outlets; and it gave plaintiff
for the first time a complete line of batteries and acces-
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sories-filters, spark plugs, fan belts, windshield wipers,
etc.-.t.o .~om~lement its ~ine of tires ( R. 48-49, 72, 94),
Plamhff s witnesses testified that plaintiff's TBA salesman, 'Valter Nelson, worked full-time calling on not
only the forty Texaco stations, but the "hundreds" of
other stations in the Salt Lake area, trying to sell all
these products-tires, batteries, and accessories-from
a fully-stocked delivery van. (R. 84, 132, 164, 176).
Yet, despite this "greatly expanded" operation,
Flinco's volume in Goodyear products never matched
its earlier volume in Hood, which had been sold from
the single outlet at 133 North First West. Its tire pur·
chases, which had exceeded $54,000. (Hood) in the
first half of 1962, fell to $34,000. (Goodyear) in the
second half, and to only $12,000. (Goodyear) in the
first half of 1963 (Ex. 5; R. 106-108). In part, this
rapid decline was due to the hostility of some of the
stations who purchased petroleum from other sources,
who regarded Flinco and its own chain of stations as
competitors and price-cutters and for this reason re·
fused to patronize Flinco by purchases of TBA (R.
ll3, ll6-ll8, 178). Thus, Flinco succeeded in identify·
ingl only twelve of its "hundreds" of potential customers
t The ultimate object of all TBA solicitation is to "identify" the
station with the brand. As witness apRoberts described this goal:
. . . [T]he service station operator, when, he goes i_nto
handling TBA he identifies the station by puttmg up a sign,
whether it is
G_oodyear sign _or a Firestone sign, ht; putsHa
valance on his wmdows. He displays the Goodyear ti.res. e
puts material on his station identified by G_oodr~c?, Fires.to~e
or Goodyear. The whole station becomes 1dentJf1ed. This is
the first thing you do.
When you identify a sta~ion ~ou put tp.e identi~ication o~
you put the finish on, you identify mate~rnl. That is what w
basically did with the ten to twelve stat10ns. (R. 129).

a
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as (;oodyear retailers, and ten of these twelve-to whom
plaintiff made "the bulk" of its sales-had been either
owned by Flinco itself, or under contract to purchase
petroleum from Flinco, before Flinco became a Goodyear dealer ( R. 61, 83-84, 86, 109, 132, 178). In the
fifteen months' life of the Goodyear franchise, plaintiff was never able to realize a profit on its TBA operation (R. 128).
Hoping "to at least try to make some money,"
Flinco began in .May, 1963, to carry a second line of
tires, the "Miller" brand manufactured by B. F. Goodrich ( R. 126, 128), which sold at retail at a bigger
mark-up over wholesale cost than did Goodyear (R.
189-190) . 2 Although in June, 1962 it had regarded the
expense of carrying two separate inventories as prohibitive ( R. 81), plaintiff chose now, after eleven months
of losses, to stock the Goodyear and Miller lines simultaneously. Almost immediately, Flinco's Goodyear
business plummeted to rock-bottom. In May, 1963, in
preparation for the big months of July and August
(R. 132) , plaintiff purchased nearly $12,000. in Miller
tires-more than double its purchases of Goodyear the
same month (Ex. 5). In June, it shipped a large quantity of these same Miller tires to a station which it had
previously identified with Goodyear (R. 218) and
throughout the summer of 1963 plaintiff's purchases
of tires reflected a continuing emphasis on the new
Miller line and a declining interest in Goodyear, as
2 Goodyear also produced second-grade tires, which plaintiff
could have carried had it wished. (R. 222) ·
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the following table, taken from Exhibit 5 illustrates:
'
l\'Ionth of Invoice
Miller
Goodyear
June
July
August
September

$3,216.41
$6,381.52
$1,ll4.91
$2,667.61

$1,253.95
$ 982.55
$ 745.3.5
$ 468.12

In July, Carl Crafts, Goodyear's \Vestern Re·
gional l\'Ianager, and other Goodyear personnel met
with apRoberts and discussed Flinco's TBA efforts.
Crafts expressed concern over Flinco's failure to pene·
trate a sufficient number of Texaco stations, and over
the addition of the :Miller tire (R. 90, 143), and re·
quested Dean Adams, a local Goodyear salesman, to
survey the petroleum market "to see what penetration
[Flinco] had made" and "to see if it was possible for
[Flinco) to handle both lines of tires" (R. 91, 92, 143·
144). The results of the survey were not introduced
into evidence, but sometime prior to September Isl
Goodyear's District .Manager recommended that the
Flin co franchise be cancelled ( R. 155) .
In early September, William Sweatt, newly-ap·
pointed Goodyear District l\'Ianager, and a number
of other Goodyear employees met with Flinco's prin·
cipal officers at the Flinco office. By the accounts of
plaintiff's witnesses, Goodyear "felt Flinco was i'.ot
performing . . . satisfactorily'', was "unhappy" with
"Flinco production of Goodyear products" and "wanted
to know what our future plans were and what, if any·
[thing), we were doing to increase our activities as far
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as the sale and promotion of Goodyear products were
concerned" (R. 59, 62, 154, 205, 219). Flinco's president replied that it contemplated one change only: to
eliminate the fully-stocked delivery van in which its
salesmen had called on stations, and to use instead a
number of petroleum salesmen who would take orders
which Flinco would fill when they returned to the office
(R. 159-160, 176-177) . Even though these salesmen
would also sell Texaco petroleum products, Flinco expected them to sell TBA to non-Texaco stations (R.
177; but see R. 160).
To Goodyear, the elimination of the delivery van
indicated further curtailment of efforts at Goodyear
sales (R. 63, 155), and Sweatt announced that he would
follow the advice of his predecessors and cancel the
contract (R. 155, 160). On September 16, 1963, defendant sent plaintiff a written notice of cancellation,
and for the next thirty days plaintiff continued to
purchase Goodyear products (Ex. 2; R. 217). On
September 19, plaintiff commenced this action (R. 5).
Soon afterwards3 plaintiff replaced its Goodyear franchise with one from B. F. Goodrich, under which it
represented the B. F. Goodrich and Miller lines and
B. F. Goodrich TBA up through the time of trial
(R. 216; Ex. 10). At the time of trial in early 1965,
plaintiff still had on hand $3,000. worth of Goodyear
inventory which it had been unable to sell (R. 211212).
' One of plaintiff's witnesses identified the lapse a_s "within a
couple of weeks " although the date of the Goodrich contract
would suggest that the period was about seven weeks. (R. 216;

Ex. 10).
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In addition to the foregoing facts, plaintiff produced evidence that during the summer of 1963, it was
rumored in the trade either that Goodyear was about
to cancel Flinco or that .Flinco was about to cancel
Goodyear (R. 174, 194); but plaintiff produced no
evidence as to who initiated the rumor, and one of
plaintiff's witnesses admitted that it could have been
a competitor or other third party ( R. 179) .
Plaintiff's witnesses also testified to statements
allegedly made by Goodyear employees to the effect
that "it was not the policy of the Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Company to allow any distributor to handle
another line of tires" ( R. 90, 152). But these same
witnesses admitted that Goodyear had not required
plaintiff to terminate its Hood line in order to take
on Goodyear, that at least one other Goodyear dis·
tributor in the area regularly sold competing brands,
and that the very person alleged to have made one such
statement thereupon authorized a study of plaintiff's
sales success "to see if it was possible for [Flinco] to
handle both lines of tires" (R. 92, 104, 127). Plain·
tiff's witnesses also admitted that defendant is only
one of four major tire companies in the Salt Lake
market, that all four are represented locally in each
major brand of service stations, and that competition
between major tire companies is "brisk" and "stiff"
(R. 62, 112-113, 147-148).
At the close of this evidence the trial court granted
defendant's motion for a directed verdict, relying on
10

authorities submitted in a memorandum by defendants
at the start of trial, and cited hereafter. Of the contraet's cancellation clause, the trial court held:
.. : B':'t ~he. fundamental proposition in this
case i~ this. fh1s contract that these parties entered mto has a provision in it that either one of
them, the pl~intiff or .the defendant, upon giving
a 30-day written notice, has the right to cancel
this contract.
~ t is an arbiti:ary provision, and the only reqmrement that is necessary is that the written
notice be given. ( R. 225-226; cf. R. 224-230).

On February 9, Hl65, plaintiff filed its notice of
appeal from the judgment of the trial court (R. 29-31).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT
ON THE CLAIM FOR ALLEGED BREACH
OF CONTRACT.
A. The Contract's Termination Provisions Are Unambiguous. They Do Not Require Goodyear to Justify its Decision
to Terminate Flinco's Dealership by a Showing of "Cood
Cause."

Defendant's motion in the trial court for a directed
Yerd ict, and its argument here for an aff irmance of
the trial court's judgment, rest principally upon para-
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graphs thirteen and fourteen of the written agreement
(Ex. 1) , which in their entirety provide:
. This agreement shall become effective when
signed by an authorized District Manager of
Goodyear and ~hall expire five ( 5) years from
date. of execut10n .unless otherwise previously
terminated as hereina,f ter provided. It cancels
and supersedes any other Franchise Agreement
and any other sales agreement now in effect be·
tween the parties covering the sale by Goodyear
to the Dealer of any product included hereund~r
(Emphasis supplied).

This agreement mav be cancelled upon thirty

( 30) days' written notice by the Dealer to Good·
year, or by Goodyear through its local manager

to the Dealer. At the expiration of said thirty
( 30) days, Goodyear shall have the right to
cancel all unfilled orders, and during such time
may refuse any orders in excess of the average
thirty-day requirements of the Dealer based on
orders actually given hereunder during the term
hereof. (Emphasis supplied).
We submit that this language entitled Goodyear
to cancel the franchise for whatever reasons it deemed
sufficient, so long as it gave plaintiff thirty days' written
notice.4 The language is plain and unmistakable: Good·
year was not required to justify its decision by pro·
ducing proof of "good cause" in court.
Almost universally, courts from other jurisdictions
have refused to engraft a requirement of "good cause"
The notice provisions were complied with (Ex._ 2), _and pl~i~·
tiff continued to purchase Goodyear products until m1d-Octo e ·
(R. 217).

4
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upon absolute rights of termination so clearly stated.
Annot. 32 A.L.R. 209, 215 ( 1924) ; cf. 52 A.L.R.
546, 547 (1928), 89 A.L.R. 252, 254 (1934). Thus,
in Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,
116 F.2d 675 (2nd Cir. 1940), where the provisions
under which Ford had cancelled a dealer's franchise
provided that "this agreement may be terminated at
any time at the will of either party by written notice
to the other party ... ," the court regarded as irreleyant plaintiff's contention that the termination was
"malicious, in bad faith, and contrary to the custom
of the trade and therefore wrongful" and held (at
p. 677):
''Tith a power of termination at will here so
unmistakably expressed, we certainly cannot
assert that a limitation of good faith was anything the parties had in mind. Such a limitation
can be read into the agreement only as. an overriding requirement of public policy. This seems
an extreme step for judges to take. The onerous
nature of the contract for the successful dealer
and the hardship which cancellation may bring
him have caused some writers to advocate it,
however; and an occasional case has seized upon
elements of overreaching to come to such a result
on particular facts. . . . But, generally speaking, the situation arises from the strong bargaining position which economic factors give
the great automobile manufacturing companies:
the dealers are not misled or imposed upon, but
accept as nonetl~eless ad:vantageous a? agreement in form bilateral, m fact one-sided. To
attempt to redres~ this balance by judicial action
without legislative authority appears to us a

13

doubt~'ul policy. \V ~ have not proper facilities

to weigh ~con01~uc factors, nor have we before
us a showmg of the supposed needs which may
~ead the manufacturers to require these seemmgly harsh bargains . . . .
Accord: Buggs v. l!'ord 1VI otor Co., 113 F. 2d 618
(7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 688 ( 1940);
Ford Motor Co. v. Kirkniyer Motor Co., 65 F.2d 1001
(4th Cir. 1933) ; ~lartin v. li'ord .ftilotor Co., 93 F.
Supp. 920 ( E.D. :Mich. 1950).
Again, in .ftilotor Car Supply Co. v. General
Hoiisehold Utilities Co., 80 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1935),
the court refused to grant recovery to a dealer who had
been canceled under a clause which read: "It is agreed
that either party may terminate this agreement by
giving thirty ( 30) days notice by registered mail to
the other." The court stated at pp. 170-171:
The law is well settled that, where a contract
for the future delivery of personal property con·
fers upon either party an arbitrary right of can·
cellation prior to delivery, it is lacking in ~u·
tuality and will be held binding upon the parties
only to the extent that it has been performed.
. . . And, with respect to distributors' contracts,
like that here under consideration, it is equally
well settled that such a contract, which does not
bind the manufacturer to sell and deliv~r, .a~1d
which is terminable at will, imposes no hab1hty
upon him if he terminates it or refuses to make
deliveries to the dealer. . . . [T]he contract
merely "furnished a basis for future dealings .to
be observed no longer than was mutually satis·
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factory. There was no hard and fast commitment of either party if he chose to break away."
And in Brooks v. Sinclair Refining Co., 139 F.2d
746 (10th Cir. 1944), the United St ates Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit refused to qualify a manufacturer's right to terminate a sales agency under the
language, "either party may terminate this agreement
at any time with or without cause." The court held at
p. 747:
The contract created an agency. Under it Sinclair was not bound to deliver any products to
Brooks, the agent, for sale and was at liberty to
reject, with or without cause, any orders taken
by Brooks and either party could terminate t~e
contract at any time with or without cause. The
contract, in so far as it was executory, was wholly
illusory. We conclude that termination of the
contract imposed no liability upon Sinclair.
For additional authority to the same effect, see:
.American Machine & Metals, Inc. v. De Bothezat Impeller Co., Iru:., 180 F.2d 342 (2d. Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 979 (1950); A. S. Rampell, Inc. v.
Hyster Co., 144 N.E. 2d 371 (N.Y. 1957); Studebaker
Corp. of America v. Wilson, 247 Fed. 403 (3rd Cir.
1918); Mohawk Agency, Inc. v. American Casualty
Co., 227 F. Supp. 745 (N.D.N.Y. 1964); Kane v.
Chrysler Corp., 80 F. Supp. 360 (D.Del. 1948); McClintock v. Truxell Sales & Service, Inc., 297 N.W.
493 (Mich. 1941).
The parties' agreement, we submit, does not limit
their right to terminate by the standard of "good cause"
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or by any other standard; and what the agreement so
clearly states in this regard the cases affirm.
B. The Trial Court Correctly Excluded Evidence of Pre.
liminary Negotiations.

The excluded evidence that prior to June 21, 1962
the parties had understood that the contract would
continue for five years was offered for the purpose of
resolving a presum~d "conflict" between paragraphs
thirteen and fourteen of the con tract ( R. 68-69). As
argued by appellant, those paragraphs are "contradic·
tory and inconsistent" because one "provides that the
agreement shall expire in five ( 5) years" and the other
"provides that the agreement may be cancelled upon
thirty days' written notice." (Br. p. 3). This trans·
parent argument simply writes out of the contract the
connecting bridge between the two provisos: "This
agreement . . . shall expire five ( 5) years from date
of execution unless otherwise previously terminated as
hereinafter provided."5 The bridge replaced, the "con·
flict" vanishes. If neither party affirmatively terminates
the relationship earlier, the contract will automatically
expire-fall of its own weight-in five years.
At most, the rejected testimony could only hare
resurrected a prior oral agreement, superseded by the
terms of the writing. For not only is the written docu·
ment free of ambiguity, it also recites (in paragraphs
twelve and thirteen) that "the entire agreement regard·
~ Plaintiff's brief virtually ignores this provision. Nowhere ~f.
its brief does plaintiff set ~ort~ the entire contractural pro
sions with respect to termmation.
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ing the subject matter is set forth herein" and that the
writing "cancels and supersedes" all earlier understandings. Even plaintiff's own cited cases acknowledge
that "the court may not add, ignore, or discard words"
in arriving at the parties' intent, Cornwall v. Willow
Creelc Country Club, 13 Utah 2d 160, 369 P.2d 928
(1962) , and limit the interpretive role of parol evidence to resolving ambiguities. Continental Bank and
1'rust Company v. Stewart, 4 Utah 2d 228, 291 P.2d
890 ( 1955); Mathis v. Madsen, 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d
952 ( 1953) . All this is horn book law.
'Vhere one has contracted in writing to pay
money, or to complete a building, or to deliver
goods or to convey land, by a specified date, that
contract supersedes and nullifies all antecedent
understandings or agreements that this performance is to be rendered by a different date. Parol
testimony to prove such an antecedent agreement would be utterly irrelevant and immaterial,
as long as it is not part of an attack upon the
validity of the subsequently made written contract. Again, if one contracts in writing (or orally) to buy and pay for property on the express
condition that no war shall break out between
this country and another before the day set for
performance, neither oral nor written testimony
will be relevant or material that the parties had
a previous understanding or agreement to buy
and pay for the property even if a war should
break ~ut. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ .573, p. 369 (2d ed. 1960).
On these well-settled principles, the proffered
testimony was of no probative value whatever, and was
properly excluded.
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C. Paragraph Six of the Agreement Does Not Contradict
Paragraph Fourteen.

Plaintiff argues in its brief that a seeming conflict
between paragraphs six and fourteen of the franchise
agreement creates an ambiguity which requires the
contract to be construed "most strongly against the
party furnishing the form"-by which plaintiff seems
to mean that neither Goodyear nor the dealer may cancel
under paragraph fourteen unless the dealer is in default, as stated in paragraph six! Paragraph six states:
Upon failure of the Dealer to make any pay·
ments when due, Goodyear may, at its option,
cancel this agreement or def er additional ship·
ments until overdue accounts have been paid.
Goodyear may decline to make deliveries except
for cash whenever it is not satisfied with Dealer's
financial responsibility.
The function of paragraph six seems quite clear
from its language. If the dealer fails to make payments
when due, Goodyear may exercise any one of three
additional remedies: it may "defer additional shipments
until overdue accounts have been paid;" it may "decline
to make deliveries except for cash;" or it may "cancel
this agreement." If it chooses the last alternative, it
is not bound, as it would be under paragraph fourteen,
to continue to fill orders for thirty days after cancel·
lation, but it may decline to make any such deliveries
"except for cash." Paragraph six is designed simply
to make available to Goodyear alternative courses of
action in a situation where the thirty-day notice re·
quirement of paragraph fourteen would prove onerous.
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It does not qualify, across-the-board, the rights created
by paragraphs thirteen and fourteen, as the fact that
its remedies are available to Goodyear only and not
to the dealer, attests.

For the reasons given, plaintiff's attempt to discard the plain words of the parties' contract is void
of merit. The trial court properly directed a verdict
for defendant on the breach of contract issue.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED A VERDICT FOR DEFENDANT
ON THE CLAIM OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 50-1-2 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(1953).

Plaintiff claims that even if the cancellation did not
breach the parties' contract, it nevertheless did violate
§ 50-1-2 UTAH ConE ANN. (1953) because it was motivated by the fact that plaintiff had taken on the competing Miller line.
The statute in question provides:
Any person or association of persons who shall
create enter into, or become a member of or a
party 'to, any pool, trust, agreem~nt, c~mbina
tion, confederation or understandmg with any
other person or persons to reg~late or fix the
price of any article of merchandise or commodity; or who shall enter into, or become a member
of or a party to, any pool, trust, a~reement'. contract, combination or confederation to fix or
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limit th~ amop,rit or quantity of any article.
co?1mod1ty or merchandise to be manufactured.
mmed, produced or sold in this state shall ht
deemed and adjudged guilty of a conspiracr
to defraud, and shall be subject to punishmer;t
as hereinafter provided.
It is clear that in order to establish a violation of
the statute, plaintiff must show both a "pool, trust,
agreement, combination, confederation or understanding with any other person or persons," and a purpose
"to fix or limit the amount or quantity" of tires sold
in the state of Utah. It is submitted that plaintiff's
evidence fails to show either.
A. The Record Contains No Evidence of Conspiracy.

On the threshold requirement of a "pool, trmt,
agreement, contract, combination or confederation,"
the sum total of plaintiff's evidence, considered in the
light most favorable to plaintiff, tended to establish
on{lJ a unilateral policy by Goodyear "not ... to allow
any distributor to handle another line of tires." (R.
90, 152). Plaintiff produced no evidence that any dis·
tributor, anywhere, had agreed with Goodyear so to
confine its activities, or that any distributor was so
much as aware of this supposed policy at a time when
it dealt exclusivelv in defendant's products. Indeed,
one may search tl;e record in vain for the name of.a
single Goodyear dealer who did deal exclusively Ill
defendant's products.
None of plaintiff's cited cases will support the
proposition that a unilateral policy of refusing to sell
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to dealers who handle competing lines violates the
conspiracy provisions of any antitrust law. Other cases
hold flatly that such a policy is not unlawful. Theatre
Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing
Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540-541 (1954) (Sherman Act);
Keifer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S.
211 ( 1951) (Sherman Act) ; Paramount Film Dist rilJll iiny Corp. v. Villaye Theater, Inc., 228 F.2d 721
(10th Cir. 1955) (Sherman Act) ; Brosius v. PepsiCo/a Co., 155 F.2d 99, 102 (3rd Cir. 1946) (Sherman
Act); Arzee Supply Corp. of Conn. v. Ruberoid Co.,
222 F. Supp. 237 (D. Conn. 1963) (Sherman Act);
Dart Drug Corp v. Parke, Davis & Co., 221 F. Supp.
948 (D.C.D.C. 1963) (Sherman Act); Nelson Radio
& Supply Co., Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911
(5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953)
(Sherman and Clayton Acts); Leo J. Meyberg Co.
v. Eureka TVilliams Corp., 215 F.2d 100 (9th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 875 (1954) (Clayton
Act); Associated Beverages Co. v. P. Ballantine &
Sons, 287 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1961) (Clayton Act);
A.B.C. Distributing Co. v. Distillers Distributing
Corp., 316 P.2d 71 (Calif. 1957) (Calif. antitrust law).

t'.

As early stated by the Supreme Court in FTC
Ra.i;mond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S. 565, 573 (1924):
It is the right, "long recognized," of a trader
engaged in an entirely private busin.ess, ''.freely
to exercise his own independent discretion as
to the parties with whom he will deal." United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307, 63
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..
L: ed. 992, 996, 7 .A.L.R. 443, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep.
4?5-. See also Umted States v. Trans-Missouri
I• reight Asso., 166 U.S. 290, 320, 41 L. ed 100'
1~020, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540; Dueber YVatcl;:
\ase l\Hg. Co. v. E. Howard \Vatch & Clod
Co., 14 C.C.A. 14, 35 U.S. Ap~. 16, 66 Feil.
637, 645; Great Atlantic & Pacific 'fea Co r
Cream of 'Vheat Co., 141 C.C.A. 594, 227 I<;ed:
.J.6, 48; 'Vholesale Grocers' Asso. v. Federal
Trade Commission ( C.C.A.) 277 Fed. 657, 664;
l\Iennen Co. v. Federal Trade Commission
(C.C.A.) 30 A.L.R. 1120, 288 Fed. 774, 780;
Alfred \Y. Booth & Co. v. Burgess, 72 N.J.
Eq. 181, 190, 65 Atl. 226; and 2 Cooley, Torts,
3d ed. 587. Thus. a retail dealer "has the un·
questioned right to stop dealing with a whole·
saler for reasons satisfactory to himself." East·
ern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Asso. r.
United States, 234 U.S. 600, 614, 58 L. ed.
1490, 1500, L.R.A. 1915A, 788, 34 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 951; United States v. Colgate & Co. supra,
p. 307. He may lawfully make a fixed rule of
conduct not to buy from a producer or manu·
facturer who sells to consumers in competition
with himself. Grenada Lumber Co. v. Missis·
sippi, 217 U.S. 433, 440, 54 L. ed. 826, 830, 30
Sup. Ct. Rep. 535. Or he may stop deal_ing
with a wholesaler who he thinks is acting unfairly
in trying to undermine his trade. Eastern States
Retail Lumber Dealers' Asso. v. United States,
supra, p. 614; United States v. Colgate & Co.
supra, p. 307. Likewi~e a '~holesale dealer !:as
the right to stop dealmg with a manufacturer
"for reasons sufficient to himself." And he may
do so because he thinks such manufacturer 15
undermining his trade by selli.ng ei_ther t? a co~·
peting wholesaler or to a retailer competmg with
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his own customers. Such other wholesaler or retailer has the reciproc~l right to stop dealing with
the manufacturer. This each may do, in the exercise of free competition, leaving it to the manufacturer to determine which customer in the exercise of his own judgment, he desire~ to retain.
On the authority of the fore going cases, we submit
that a unilateral policy to refuse to deal, whatever the
motive, does not in and of itself constitute evidence of
a "pool, trust, agreement, contract, combination or
confederation" within the prohibition of § 50-1-2 of
the Utah statutes.
B. The Record Contains no Evidence of Intent to Restrict
the Quantity of Goods to be Sold in the State.

Not only did plaintiff fail to produce evidence of
a combination or conspiracy, it failed to produce evidence that Goodyear intended "to fix or limit the
amount or quantity of any article ... to be ... sold
in this state"-the second sine qua non of the statute.
As cases arising under the federal antitrust laws have
recognized, exclusive dealing contracts are not always
conceived in sin. They sometimes have legitimate purposes and no adverse competitive effects, and under
federal law, therefore, they are not per se unlawful.
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S.
320 (1961); Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 267 F. 2d 11 (6th Cir. 1959).
Plaintiff here produced no evidence that Good~'ear 's "policy" was intended substantially to lessen
competition in tires or to limit the quantity of tires
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so~d by plaintiff or anyone else in Utah. The sliglii
e_vidence of record, indeed, hints that Goodyear mai
s.1mply l~ave been concerned that dealers carrying othe.r
Imes might lack the capital and personnel to stock
fully and represent the Goodyear line as well-a con.
cern which plaintiff at one time shared (R. 81). For.
in the only examples supplied by the record, Goodvear
(a) freely supplied the dealer (Big 'O' in Bountiful!
even though the dealer carried competing lines (R.
127), and (b) und~rtook a study of the dealer's (plain·
tiff's) sales success "to see if it was possible for [the
dealer J to handle both lines of tires" ( R. 92) .
Unlike Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 G.S.
293 (1949) ,6 where the government produced evidence
that Standard's exclusive dealing contracts tied to ii.I
products nearly 6,000 independent retail gasoline out·
lets having an annual volume in excess of $65,000,000.,
plaintiff here produced no evidence that any Goodyear
dealer had agreed to boycott competing lines or that
any Goodyear dealer (other than plaintiff itself) ban
in fact-independently or otherwise-quit a competing
line. Here the evidence of record tends to dispel all
suspicions that Goodyear's alleged policy injured com·
6 The Standard Oil case relied on by plaintiff involved a fede.ral
act (section 3 of the Clayton Act) which prohibit~ exc.lu~1ve
dealing contracts where the effect of such contracts is to miure
competition or tend to create a monopoly. H~re the Utah statule
prohibits combinations, contracts, confederacies, etc., whose pur·
pose is to restrict the quantity of goods sold. In the federal case
the question was whether the reqt~ire~ents c_ontracts in ques)rnn
used by Standard Oil Company with its stations tended to bmit
competition for the station operator',s business. Both the ~ac);
and the law in that case are mapposite to the statute a1:1d acj
in the case at bar: .Here pl?-intiff has fai.led to show either:!
the statutory requisites, which are far different from those
the federal act.
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petition or limited the quantity of tires sold in Utah.
Goodyear was one of four major tire companies in
the Salt Lake area, all four were represented in the
major gas stations, and Goodyear was the last of the
four to be recognized by Texaco. Competition, insofar
as the record shows, was "brisk" and "stiff." (R. 44,
62, 112-113, 147-148).

On this evidence, no jury could justifiably have
found that Goodyear's alleged "policy" of exclusive
dealing was intended to, or did, "fix or limit the .
quantity" of goods to be sold in the state of Utah.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has wholly failed to produce evidence
from which the trier of fact might have found that
defendant had either breached its contract with plaintiff or had violated the antitrust laws of the state of
Ctah. The trial court correctly excluded evidence which
would have yaried the terms of the written agreement,
and even if such evidence had been admitted, it would
not luffe been sufficient to send the breach of contract
issue to the jury. Plaintiff's failures of proof require
an affirmance of the judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted this 9th day of July, 1965.
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